


ES9  
DIES  
75-42571  
W-5.2  
R2 #17

4 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General  
Mr. Knoche ✓

SUBJECT : DCI Review of Directorate of  
Intelligence Activities

This is to report formally that there has been no unfavorable impact on the execution of DDI responsibilities as a result of the instructions issued by the Director after his 1973-74 review of DDI activities and assistance to other Government agencies.



PAUL V. WALSH  
Associate Deputy Director  
for Intelligence

W-5.2

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Executive Registry

75-425

20 JAN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Knoche  
Dr. Chamberlain

The DD/S&T has reviewed the impact of the guidelines established by the Director in May and August 1973. With one exception, we find that they have not hindered the effectiveness of our operations. Indeed, their existence in explicit form has simplified our life by enabling us to make clear decisions about questionable activities and provides a basis for our refusing to provide support to other agencies or components where it might otherwise be difficult to do so. The single exception involves the information we formerly obtained from the [redacted] program. We have found, however, that it is possible to obtain adequate information in other ways; these alternative approaches do, however, involve greater risk, greater costs, and substantially more inconvenience. In conclusion, our review shows that the guidelines have not adversely affected our ability to carry on work in support of the national security. Attached are specific responses from ORD, OTS and NPIC.

[redacted]  
Sayre Stevens  
Associate Deputy Director  
for  
Science and Technology

Attachments:  
As Stated

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
TO: <i>HES</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	<i>TC</i>
REMARKS: <i>2 ER file.</i>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

29 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General .  
THROUGH: Associate Deputy Director for Science  
and Technology  
SUBJECT: Questionable Activities Questions


1. Has OTS ever detailed an officer to the White House for either security or domestic affairs?

OTS has never detailed an officer to the White House for any purpose.



3. Has OTS ever detailed an employee to another U.S. government agency, while retaining the employee on the Agency's payroll?

There has been no case when OTS loaned an OTS officer to another U.S. government agency in order to occupy a position. We continue to support other agencies on a case-by-case basis, after acquiring those necessary approvals designated by the DCI.



SUBJECT: Questionable Activities Questions

4. What is the cumulative impact on OTS of the thirteen points provided by the DCI relating to questionable activities?

There is little impact on the OTS support provided to other Agency components. The guidelines are considered a net gain to OTS because it is easier to turn off requests from other U.S. government agencies which require OTS manpower, equipment and monies. The guidelines should also encourage closer scrutiny by Agency components when OTS support is requested

David S. Brandwein  
Director  
Office of Technical Service

SECRET

DDI # 337  
ORD-0390-75

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for  
Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Impact on ORD of DCI Guidelines on  
Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities

1. In response to your request we have reviewed, from the standpoint of impact on ORD programs, the DCI guidelines on non-foreign intelligence activities. Our finding is there has been no adverse effect. On the contrary, their explicitness has been helpful even though independently we had been operating within the scope of the guidelines. We now spend extra time reviewing programs for potentially questionable activities. Any proposed activity that is deemed at all questionable is brought to the attention of the Office of the DD/S&T. To refresh your memory I am including a summary of ORD activities incident to the guidelines.

25X1


3. ORD has complied with the guidelines in every respect. Activities specifically precluded are:

a. Servicing DEA R&D requirements;

S E C R E T

- b. Support to LEAA, local or state police organizations of the United States;
- c. Disclosing or retaining information on U.S. citizens collected during testing in the U.S;
- d. Conducting technical surveillance of U.S. citizens;
- e. Doing experiments, using drugs or other techniques with the ultimate goal of controlling human behavior, unless specifically approved by the DCI, and in no case on American citizens unaware of the nature of the tests being performed.

In addition, we are to operate within the constraints imposed by the guidelines calling for care in relation to significant domestic events and those involving support to other government agencies.

  
James V. Hirsch  
Director of Research and Development

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt